

## **1.1. “From Adversaries to Partners: CSCE Experience in Building Confidence”**

Speech at the Tel Aviv University  
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*Tel Aviv, 5 March 1995*

### **I.**

#### **Introduction**

Writing about the new challenges facing Europe and America, Henry Kissinger recently used one of his masterly short sentences as the basis of his analysis: “Now we are living in another world”. One aspect of this change is that a new sense of neighbourliness, a new understanding of common chances and challenges is developing. During the last two years almost all European institutions have started to forge new links with Mediterranean countries. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also wishes to strengthen its Mediterranean dimension. It is of particular importance that these political impulses are coming from Europe as well as from countries on the southern rim of the Mediterranean.

The CSCE, as the OSCE was called before 1 January of this year, was established twenty years ago as a conference to manage détente of East-West confrontation. It was crucial that European security was not defined in a purely geographical sense. The inclusion of the United States and Canada was a prerequisite for the CSCE’s success. But beyond this firm and full integration of the transatlantic dimension, the CSCE, from its very inception, tried to take into account security factors originating in neighbouring regions as well. The Helsinki Final Act stated twenty years ago that “security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole.”

Multilateral dialogue between the CSCE and Israel and other non-participating Mediterranean States started in the early 70’s with the drafting of the Final Act. An informal working group was set up for this purpose. That dialogue was continued at all main CSCE follow-up meetings. Several specialized meetings on the Mediterranean region were held. Israel was an active participant. These meetings produced recommendations and proposals concerning environmental protection in the region, economic policy, development and culture. Quite understandably, substantive security issues could not be addressed. For the Middle East conflict, the CSCE had no responses to offer.

Now we are witness to the successes and challenges of peace diplomacy in the Middle East, a key aspect of a different world. Israel has made decisive contributions, as have the other participants. The Nobel Prize awarded to its leaders is a testimony to that. The OSCE community also profits from the advance of peace in your region. At the Budapest Summit last December, the Heads of State or Government welcomed “progress towards peace in the Middle East and its positive implications for European security.” The normalization of relations in the area had made it possible that, for the first time, Israel and four other Mediterranean States – Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and

Tunisia – could present common proposals for the development of the OSCE’s Mediterranean dimension. This encouraged the OSCE States to agree on a new framework for co-operation with these non-participating Mediterranean States. The Budapest Summit took a number of operative steps in this direction, including the establishment of a contact group, the holding of seminars, the inclusion of Mediterranean issues in the agenda of the OSCE bodies, and arranging for high-level political dialogue.

This new phase in OSCE-Mediterranean relations will create new possibilities for dialogue and co-operation. One aspect of this co-operation will be the sharing of experience which the CSCE has accumulated over the past twenty years. Some elements of this experience could be useful in developing solutions to the problems in the Middle East. I would be glad if my presentation today would contribute to that effort.

## II.

### **The Political Landscape in Europe Twenty Years Ago and the Helsinki Final Act.**

The concept of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was developed in an effort to try dialogue and co-operation as a means to defuse the risks of the Cold War confrontation. The Conference was launched in 1972 in the form of the first of a series of preparatory meetings. But for more than five-years before 1972, a protracted “communiqué dialogue” between NATO and the Warsaw Pact had gradually developed a common basis for the conference project. Western and Eastern objectives as regards the CSCE were very different. The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries saw the CSCE as a means of achieving once and for all acceptance of the post-war status quo, in particular a divided Germany. Their aim was to make permanent the existing territorial, political and ideological “realities”. The Western countries, on the contrary, saw the Conference as a way of easing conditions within, and relations with, the Communist monolith. The West wanted to introduce a number of more dynamic elements for inter-state relations and military aspects of security, as well as human rights, beginning with freer movement of peoples, information and ideas. The support for such a concept of an all-European Conference was the result of a difficult re-appraisal of Western policies towards the East. As concluded in the “Harmel Report” approved by the NATO Council in December 1967, “military security and a policy of détente” were perceived not as “contradictory, but complementary.” This was also the essence of de Gaulle’s famous “triad” of “entente, détente, co-operation” and Willy Brandt’s German “Ostpolitik”.

When détente policies were first introduced, relations on the European continent had reached a dead end. Political dialogue was practically non-existent, diplomatic relations were far from normal, huge and still growing military potentials opposed each other, the “war of nerves” was common practice, economic links had been severed deliberately and by non-compatibility of systems. People were prevented from making contacts, travelling and exchanging ideas; the iron curtain was nearly impenetrable.

The Helsinki Final Act, which became the CSCE's first constitution, was signed on 1 August 1975. It was in a sense a response to these challenges born of the European confrontation. The Act was a comprehensive statement of principles and commitments by States concerning their behaviour towards each other and of States towards their citizens. As a product of compromise, it was a mixture of status-quo-preserving and dynamic elements. As usual, conservatives on both sides felt that the chances for success were too weak to justify the obvious inherent dangers. Only history could prove that the dynamic elements were stronger and would make the CSCE an important vehicle for promoting change – ultimately going far beyond initial expectations.

The Final Act codified a political basis for relations on the continent, establishing in particular the principles guiding the behaviour of States towards each other. Among these principles there was one of particular significance – respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Its substance was modest and very limited. The notion of “democracy” was not to be found in the whole Final Act, except, of course, in the name of the German “Democratic” Republic. But one very general provision was eventually transformed into a driving force for change. The Final Act affirmed that the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms “is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves ...”.

I would like to underline in this context that the Helsinki Final Act, as well as all later CSCE agreements, with few exceptions, were politically binding commitments. They did not and still do not have the character of legally binding provisions. Experience has shown that this was an important advantage. It allowed for step-by-step improvements, without having to cross repeatedly the difficult hurdle of 35 ratifications. It has also been demonstrated that the respect shown by the participating States for CSCE commitments and their readiness to implement them was hardly different from their attitude to full-fledged and legally binding treaties or conventions. I think it is therefore correct to speak of CSCE commitments as “soft law”.

Built into the Final Act was the concept of the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security. As usual in negotiating fundamental relationships, the right linkage was the vehicle for achieving the right compromises. The NATO States, from the very first diplomatic explorations up to the convening of the CSCE, insisted that there was an intrinsic link between military and political détente. Central Europe was at that time the most militarized area of the world. Thousands of heavy weapons were in a state of high combat readiness. The Soviet conventional superiority was the West's chief military concern. The burden of developing and maintaining a conventional counter-force became increasingly difficult to bear in Western democratic societies.

A very complex issue at that time was how to negotiate eventual conventional disarmament measures. It was conceptually too difficult to envisage disarmament negotiations among the 35 CSCE States covering the entire area between Vancouver and Vladivostok. Basic problems existed between the two military alliances – NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and it was evident that these problems had to be solved. To negotiate a conventional balance between the 35 CSCE States seemed to

be almost impossible. The other problem was the area of application for conventional disarmament measures. The biggest concentration was in Central Europe, including or directly neighbouring the vast Soviet Union. On the Western side, the US, as strongest ally, was separated from Europe by the Atlantic. But the Soviet Union did not want to agree to include its territory without reciprocal “compensation” in the form of including American territory.

All these “disparities” led to a very complex construction. After lengthy preparatory talks, the Warsaw Pact countries agreed to establish conventional disarmament negotiations within the framework of the so-called “Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions” (MBFR), which were to be separate from the CSCE but parallel to it. In principle, NATO and Warsaw Pact countries were at the negotiating table, but France opted out on the grounds that it did not want to accept a bloc-to-bloc formula. The area of application of eventual MBFR measures was limited to Central Europe and was therefore not identical with the circle of participants, which included not only States whose territory was located in the zone, but also States with military potential deployed there, such as the US, Great Britain, Canada and the Soviet Union. In addition, several neighbouring States were present at the talks as “special participants”.

The effort to achieve balance within these parameters foundered. The experts got lost in increasingly technical debate. After more than 10 years, the MBFR negotiations ended without any formal result. Some felt that the negotiations had proved that “MBFR” should be read as “much better for the Russians”. The MBFR did, however, prepare the ground for new and successful negotiations (CFE).

The CSCE proper, although not mandated to deal with force reductions, made military aspects of security an increasingly important subject on its agenda. The Final Act introduced the concept of confidence-building measures. The aim was to build trust through increased transparency and predictability of military activities. Initially applied on a voluntary basis without genuinely meaningful parameters, they matured into significant arms-control measures. Step by step they were developed, amplified and made more stringent. Today CSBMs within the OSCE area, or within certain parts of it, form an elaborate system of measures relating to defence planning, information on armed forces, risk reduction, military contacts, notification and observation of military activities, verification and evaluation, constraints and communication.

Confidence related to military aspects of security could only develop in a broad, comprehensive context. When the proposals for CSCE negotiations were separated into “baskets”, the political and military dimension became Basket I, while humanitarian and related matters were put in Basket III (economic issues being Basket II). The linkage was clearly expressed by the then UK Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, who stated at the founding of the Conference, “In the language of Helsinki, Basket I will be empty unless there are plenty of eggs in Basket III.” The core issue in this basket was the freer movement of people, information and ideas.

The first negotiated results in this extremely complex area were very modest provisions. They required, for example, favourable consideration of applications for travel for family visits or the reuniting of families and for exit permits for mixed marriages. Weeks of negotiation were necessary to reach agreement that visa fees should be reduced. Step by step, tighter provisions were introduced to eliminate

restrictive interpretations and delays in issuing travel documents. But the CSCE helped to create the first cracks in the Wall so that some people on both sides got a chance to meet.

The Helsinki Final Act was also used to develop a somewhat freer access to information, to limit jamming of radio broadcasts in Eastern Europe, and to relax the control over speech and print. The East was ready to make such concessions in exchange for greater economic opportunities. Its ailing economy was in desperate need of Western capital and technological transfers. The opening up of business contacts and the increased flow of economic and commercial information, including reliable statistics, had unforeseen side effects: For one thing, the inefficiency of the closed Soviet-style system was increasingly exposed.

### **III.**

#### **The CSCE as a Catalyst of Peaceful Change**

A complicated network of linkages and quid-pro-quo resulted in a balancing of interests, which created the basis for a continuing CSCE process. But the development of the CSCE was not linear. It had its dramatic ups and downs. As a political and increasingly comprehensive and substantial entity, it was not immune to changes in the international climate. When the West exposed Soviet hypocrisy evidenced in human-rights violations, as happened at the first follow-up meeting in 1977 in Belgrade, the process was on the verge of collapse. But this insistence lent a new credibility to the Helsinki Commitments. The signal was understood – the Final Act had to be taken seriously.

The Soviet Afghanistan invasion almost brought the CSCE to a halt, as did the imposition of martial law in Poland. The medium-range missile crisis, with its peak in 1983-84, paralysed political dialogue in Europe. By that time, however, the CSCE had matured to the extent that it was able to help provide channels for contacts preventing a return to all-out confrontation.

But CSCE progress also had its milestones. In the military field, the first bold step after Helsinki was taken with the Madrid decisions of 1983. The Soviet Union agreed to extend the area of application of confidence- and security-building measures to the whole of its European territory as far as the Ural Mountains. Before that, only a narrow strip of 250 km adjacent to its European neighbours had been covered. A special negotiating body – Conference on Security- and Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe – was established. In 1986 the Conference, meeting in Stockholm, achieved a breakthrough agreement. For the first time, the Soviet Union was ready to accept on-site military inspections on the European continent without the right of refusal. Mistrust and suspicion started to dissipate. Beyond this inspection regime, the Soviet Union accepted in Stockholm an ambitious CSBM package that made all measures obligatory and more stringent than in Helsinki. This new policy toward the West owed much to Gorbachev's "new thinking" and his main concern: the economy. He realized that the arms race had put a burden on his country that was becoming unbearable. He understood well that the Soviet Union had to give concrete,

positive signals in order to open the way for Western economic involvement, which would help to alleviate the rapidly escalating economic problems.

New obligations in the field of confidence- and security-building measures were also meant to test the ground for more far-reaching disarmament undertakings. Since the MBFR negotiations were deadlocked, the Warsaw Pact made a new arms control bid in 1986, thus indicating a willingness to accept the concept of deep asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces, provided a new European disarmament forum was established to negotiate the cuts. This opened up new perspectives for progress, since the core problem of European military stability was Soviet conventional supremacy, particularly its potential for large-scale offensive action. The new initiative led to the negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which brought together all Warsaw Pact and NATO States, including France.

These CFE negotiations were conducted in 1989-90. Although limited to the members of the two alliances, they were explicitly held within the larger framework of the CSCE process. And although the overall framework was represented by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the participants acted as sovereign and independent individual States. This was very important for the Warsaw Pact countries as the Soviet bloc started to disintegrate. This formula of the negotiations and the political link to the CSCE process assured the viability of the CFE Treaty after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Treaty, signed in Paris in November 1990, introduced deep reductions in the heavy weaponry of conventional armed forces, which had turned out to be easier to locate and count than personnel. Around 50,000 tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft and helicopters will be destroyed over a period to be completed within the next few months.

The Human Dimension also had its milestone improvements. One of them was the establishment of the very concept of the Human Dimension. This concept went far beyond the Helsinki principle of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and co-operation in the humanitarian field (contacts, information, culture and education). Many were surprised to hear, at the beginning of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting in November 1986, more or less in parallel with the new steps in the field of arms control, a proposal from the new Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, to hold a Human Rights Conference in Moscow. Some even considered it a provocation, in view of the Soviet human rights record. I still remember the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, comparing it to “a drinking party in Mecca”. But in 1989 it was finally accepted not least as a real test of the policy of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika*. And it turned out that the Soviet Union no longer refused to provide clarification on concrete human rights issues and to conduct a dialogue that it had previously refused.

The Human Dimension Meeting in Copenhagen 1990 achieved recognition for its far-reaching agreements, especially in the area of national minorities. The standards adopted in this multilateral framework also helped to solve a lot of problems in negotiating far-reaching bilateral agreements between CSCE States, for example, between Germany and Poland.

The Moscow Human Dimension Meeting, held in October 1991, was the concluding stage of this series of conferences. It took place in the wake of the coup in Moscow in late summer 1991. The fact that CSCE participants clearly refused to accept the results of the coup played a part in aborting it. Against this background, the Soviet Union not only joined but made strenuous efforts to secure an agreement establishing that human dimension issues be matters of direct and legitimate concern to all other CSCE participating States. Thus, interference in “internal affairs” became a legitimate action in defence of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Fundamental disagreements about the structure of the economies were part of the division and confrontation between East and West. It was perhaps an expression of the crucial role played by economic concerns in Gorbachev’s new policies that the real *Perestroika* of the CSCE came at the CSCE Conference on Economic Co-operation in Europe. Held in Bonn in the spring of 1990 at a time of profound and rapid transformation in Europe, it formulated new, far-reaching agreements between participating States on fundamental values and objectives. This agreement encompassed market economies, multi-party democracy based on free elections and human rights, freedom of enterprise, the protection of private property, the free flow of trade, capital, investment and the repatriation of profits. In short: for the first time, all CSCE participating States agreed that democratic institutions and fundamental rights and freedoms foster economic and social progress. The Bonn Document also stressed the need to create conditions that would improve economic relations between the States and encourage direct contacts between their business communities. The agreements on practical measures featured a readiness to strengthen economic information channels and networks, to standardise statistical data and account systems, to promote management and expert training, to develop industrial co-operation and, not least, to pay special attention to the creation of a competitive business environment conducive to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises.

What was the secret of the CSCE’s vitality? Why was it able to progress despite sometimes formidable challenges? The Final Act was not, of course, a magic formula for the dismantling of the “socialist” system. The CSCE must also be seen as just one element in a very complex and comprehensive process. CSCE progress was as much a result of changing realities as an instrument of further changes. There are, however, specific CSCE contributions. First, the CSCE provided a political platform and moral support for the champions of democratic change inside the Warsaw Pact countries, like “Charter 77” in Czechoslovakia or “Solidarity” in Poland. They were the true victors in the 1989 “autumn of peoples”. They derived legitimacy and a certain power from the ideas enshrined in the Helsinki Act. Second, by building an elaborate system of political channels and bridges, the CSCE made it possible for the West, including many neutral and non-aligned countries, to build continuously on the ongoing changes within the “socialist system”. I think it was also a result of these “links” and “bridges” that the collapse of communist societies was not accompanied by major and violent convulsions.

The CSCE prepared the ground for overcoming the division of Europe by peaceful means. With the collapse of one totalitarian regime after another, the CSCE contributed to revolutionary changes far beyond its initial concepts.

## IV.

### From CSCE to OSCE

With the end of the Cold War, the CSCE had progressed much farther than initially expected in the West. The Paris Summit, in November 1990, set the CSCE on a new course – that of making the end of confrontation irreversible and consolidating the difficult process of transformation of the Central and Eastern European nations.

The Charter of Paris for a New Europe further advanced agreement on a comprehensive concept for developing market economies in the direction of sustainable economic growth. Economic liberty, social justice and a sense of responsibility for the environment were acknowledged as being indispensable for prosperity. The participating States reaffirmed the need to support democratic countries in transition towards the establishment of market economies, as well as to ensure their increased integration into the international economic and financial system.

Confronted with an early, unexpected resurgence of local conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Moldova, the Caucasus and Tajikistan, the new CSCE was forced to assume an active role in conflict prevention and crisis management.

Given that the military aspects of security are no longer the dominant factor for stability, the CSCE stressed its comprehensive concept of security. Its agenda reflects the interrelationship between human rights and fundamental freedoms, economics and military security.

Today the OSCE is an international institution with 53 participating States. Its area stretches from Vancouver to Vladivostock, and it is the sole forum bringing together on an equal basis all the States of Europe, North America and Central Asia, (Serbia/Montenegro has been suspended from participation since 1992). Before 1990, the CSCE was a conference and its task was to introduce dynamic elements into a frozen status quo based on confrontation and deterrence. Since 1990, the CSCE has been transformed step by step into an organization whose task is to manage a difficult period by making practical contributions to the creation of new stability, based on common interests and values.

Today there are three OSCE priorities:

- to consolidate common values and build civil societies;
- to prevent local conflicts, restore stability and bring peace to war-torn areas;
- to overcome real and perceived security deficits and to avoid the creation of new divisions by promoting a co-operative system of security.

Human rights, democracy and the rule of law are at the heart of the OSCE's concerns. The challenge today is to ensure implementation of the very exacting OSCE standards. The participating States in transition from totalitarianism to democracy want to develop the foundations of civil societies, but many of them lack traditions of democracy or even experience of statehood.

In order to implement human dimension commitments, the OSCE applies co-operative methods. It provides assistance, advice and encouragement. It tries to monitor the human dimension record of OSCE States, in close co-operation with NGOs. The aim is to persuade a State with problems in this area to follow the OSCE's advice and remedy the situation. It is important to note that the OSCE has no enforcement powers – that is the prerogative of the UN Security Council. The OSCE's ultima ratio is exclusion. But exclusion is a last-resort instrument and one that signals failure.

The OSCE's operational arm in the human dimension is the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Its activities concentrate on election monitoring, the provision of training and expertise, and the organization of implementation assessment meetings and seminars.

For the CSCE, the most fundamental challenge in the post-confrontation period was its active involvement in conflict prevention and crisis management. At the Helsinki Summit in July 1992, the OSCE declared itself to be a regional arrangement within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. This meant sharing with the UN, in the non-enforcement area, the responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the OSCE region. As local conflicts escalated into regional wars and many potential instabilities became apparent, the OSCE was challenged to take action.

First, at the weekly meetings of its Permanent Council in Vienna, the OSCE offers its participating States the opportunity for frank and open dialogue on any political issue they may wish to address.

Second, the OSCE Chairmanship works in a flexible way to investigate situations, verify facts and opinions, and prepare the ground for further OSCE involvement. The OSCE Chair is chosen for a term of one year. This year that office is held by Hungary; next year Switzerland will chair the OSCE.

Third, one of the particularly successful instruments of the OSCE is the High Commissioner on National Minorities. Most of the existing or potential conflicts in the OSCE area are rooted in ethnic causes. The task of the High Commissioner is to respond, through quiet diplomacy and at the earliest possible stage, to ethnic tensions that have the potential to develop into a conflict. Intended not as a national minorities ombudsman, nor as an investigator of individual human rights violations, the High Commissioner seeks to promote the early resolution of ethnic tensions that might endanger peace, stability, or relations between OSCE participating States. When tensions threaten to degenerate into conflict, the High Commissioner can issue an "early warning" to the OSCE, formally calling attention to the seriousness of the situation. Mr. Max van der Stoep, a former foreign minister of the Netherlands, currently holds the post and has so far been involved in several specific cases which include the Baltic States, in particular Estonia and Latvia, Slovakia and Hungary, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Romania, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Fourth, the OSCE resident Missions have a central place in the OSCE inventory of conflict prevention and crisis management instruments. Their main task is to facilitate political processes aimed at preventing or settling conflicts through an OSCE presence

on the ground. These missions are small and are diplomatic or diplomatic-military in composition. They are staffed by personnel seconded by individual participating States. At this time, eight resident Missions are operating in the Baltics and several CIS countries, as well as in the Balkans.

The OSCE has also developed several specific instruments for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration, signed by 33 States and ratified by more than 12 States, entered into force on 5 December 1994. It establishes an obligatory conciliation procedure leading to non-binding proposals for settlement. Arbitration procedures are based on the agreement of the States Parties and lead to a decision that is binding upon the Parties. In this context, the OSCE has developed a “directed conciliation” procedure under which participating States can be instructed by the OSCE Ministerial Council to seek conciliation.

One of the aims of the OSCE is to strengthen co-operative security throughout the OSCE area. The OSCE cannot, however, provide collective defence; it does not, therefore, offer its participating States the active security guarantees of an alliance. But by promoting co-operation in security matters the OSCE helps to strengthen not only the perception but also the implementation of indivisible security. This concept implies the commitment by all participating States, individually and collectively, not to enhance their own security at the expense of the security of other States.

Through its permanent bodies in Vienna, the OSCE provides a forum where security concerns of participating States are discussed, and their security interests are heard and acted upon.

A “Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security” agreed at the Budapest Summit introduced new elements into the security relations of the OSCE States. These States have affirmed that “they are determined to act in solidarity if CSCE norms and commitments are violated and to facilitate concerted responses to security challenges that they may face as a result. They will consult promptly, in conformity with their CSCE responsibilities, with a participating State seeking assistance in realizing its individual or collective self-defence. They will consider jointly the nature of the threat and actions that may be required in defence of their common values.”

The OSCE is the guardian of far-reaching arms control agreements that form the basis of a new order of co-operative security in Europe: The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. As already mentioned, the CFE agreement introduced strict limits for key military equipment held by the States of NATO and the former Warsaw Treaty Organization and, in a second step, for their military personnel as well. Europe, which for many years has been the area of the most tense confrontations and the highest concentration of weapons, has embarked on an unprecedented demilitarization process resulting in the destruction of tens of thousands of pieces of equipment. A very intensive system of information exchange and intrusive verification is in place. An elaborate system of confidence-building measures completes the controls put on military activity and at the same time provides for a number of early warning indicators.

## V.

### Some Conclusions

Europe, the OSCE area, is still trying to cope with the new and very complex problems of transition. In particular, the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Caucasus have confronted us with burning issues for which, at this point, we still do not have solutions. Also, States in the Balkans and in the CIS, and also some States in Central Europe, are burdened with problems. The Russian Federation is seeking to define its place in a new European security architecture.

The OSCE is just one structure among others challenged with developing answers to these very demanding new questions. The European Union, NATO, the Council of Europe and, not least, the United Nations must make their contributions in a co-ordinated effort to achieve new stability. From my point of view, it is rather a strength than a weakness that there are several structures with overlapping membership and, to a certain extent, overlapping tasks. Each of these organizations has certain comparative advantages, which can ensure the very specific contributions which are needed. As co-operation and co-ordination improve, a new European security structure is emerging.

With the key issues still unsolved, there is no room for complacency. But we can be encouraged by the CSCE experience. Patience was important then and it is important now. Looking back at the dramatic changes brought about by the CSCE process, we might be tempted to describe it as a goal-oriented concept inevitably destined to produce these results. In fact, throughout virtually the entire CSCE process, no one could be sure of the end results. On some occasions the process was very close to breakdown. Perhaps one of the most important ingredients for success was that the process continued, even amidst very difficult circumstances and after extremely serious setbacks. Another essential factor was that at certain points calculated risks were taken with respect to military aspects of security and also in the human dimension area.

I tend to believe that in the final analysis it was above all “the courage of men and women, the strength of the will of the peoples” (Charter of Paris) which enabled Europe to liberate itself from the legacy of the past. These people fought with peaceful means for a more humane society within the OSCE area. Many of them were motivated by the right mixture of realism and vision. The vision – for many of them – was taken from the Bible:

“...and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up a sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.”