

The OSCE Secretariat bears no responsibility for the content of this document and circulates it without altering its content. The distribution by OSCE Conference Services of this document is without prejudice to OSCE decisions, as set out in documents agreed by OSCE participating States.

FSC.DEL/275/26
9 July 2026

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

Delegation of the Russian Federation

**STATEMENT BY
MS. IULIA ZHDANOVA, HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON MILITARY SECURITY
AND ARMS CONTROL, AT THE 1140th PLENARY MEETING OF THE
OSCE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION**

24 June 2026

**Agenda item: General statements
Subject: Dangerous course of NATO and the European Union towards the
militarization of Europe**

Mr. Chairperson,

At today's meeting, a number of delegations repeatedly referred to the Russian Federation as an "aggressor country" or a "State committing aggression". In line with the Rules of Procedure, we believe that utterances in the form of emotionally charged value judgements that take the place of legal categorization are unacceptable at this platform. Although legal matters generally fall outside the remit of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), bearing in mind the particular significance of this aspect for an accurate assessment of the politico-military situation, we should like to clarify that, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations, only the United Nations Security Council is authorized to determine the existence of an act of aggression. There is not a single such decision to back up the insinuations that have been made.

At the same time, we should like to draw attention to the judgment pronounced on 31 January 2024 by the International Court of Justice in The Hague on the merits of the dispute between Ukraine and Russia concerning the interpretation and application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. One gets the impression that not only the governments, but also, regrettably, the judicial authorities of some Western countries remain unaware of the content of this ruling even after two years. The Court categorically refused to bow to Ukraine's demands and declare Russia to be an "aggressor State"; it explicitly pointed out that there were no grounds whatsoever for considering the People's Republics of Donetsk and Lugansk to be "terrorist organizations"; and it completely dismissed all of Ukraine's allegations concerning "State sponsorship of terrorism" on the part of the Russian Federation, and so on.

Particular mention should also be made of the judgment issued on 2 February 2024 by the International Court of Justice in The Hague in the *Ukraine v. Russian Federation* case involving the interpretation and application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Even at the preliminary stage, all of Ukraine's claims that Russia had allegedly violated the

Convention by “misusing” it to justify the launching of the special military operation were completely dismissed by the Court.

Incidentally, in September 2023, at Court hearings in The Hague, 32 teams of Western lawyers (from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) spoke one after another in support of Ukraine, using virtually identical scripts, whereby they turned these hearings into a veritable farce (does that ring any bells?). However, they failed to get their way. The Court is currently considering just one question, namely whether Ukraine committed genocide in Donbass.

This, unlike many of the statements made by the delegations in attendance here, is not an arbitrary interpretation of events, but a legal fact with a direct bearing on the international principles of responsible export controls on arms shipments. At present, a number of countries, either acting individually or in league with others, are actively showering weapons on a State against which a case concerning the possible perpetration of genocide is being heard before the highest international court.

What are the motives of these “generous” sponsors? It is absolutely clear that, if we are talking about security and the protection of certain values in this instance, then those values are of a material nature, and the security in question is financial – albeit reserved for the select few and, at that, illusory.

Let me give you just a few examples.

Since 2022, the volume of Czech defence sector exports has increased sevenfold – from 0.6 billion euros in 2021 to 4.1 billion euros in 2025. Military equipment worth around 11 billion euros has been shipped to Ukraine by Czech defence companies. Significant foreign funding was secured thanks to the Czech ammunition initiative, launched in early 2024 to supply the Kyiv regime with artillery shells. For several years now, NATO-standard 155 mm calibre shells have consistently been among the top three “tools” used against the life and limb of civilians in the front-line territories of our country. The Czech Government, having taken it upon itself to implement that initiative, has become an accomplice in the killing of thousands of Russian civilians.

The Franco-German defence corporation KNDS – the largest manufacturer of tanks, heavy armoured vehicles, and weapons systems – took the lead in the global land weapons market in 2025. Over the past year, the company’s turnover grew by 16 per cent to 4.4 billion euros. Deliveries of new batches of Leopard 2 tanks alone enabled it to rake in a profit of 2,660 million euros. This particular experiment undertaken as part of the latest wave of militarization of Germany’s economy proved so lucrative that the German Government intends to acquire 40 per cent of the company’s shares.

Germany is the leading supplier of arms to a regime suspected of genocide. The value of German defence contractor Rheinmetall’s stock has risen more than twentyfold over the past ten years. According to public sources, Rheinmetall shares were trading at 80 euros in December 2021; this year, their price has already soared to 2,000 euros. Since 2021, turnover has almost doubled (from 5.7 billion euros in 2021 to around 10 billion euros in 2024); the company hopes to increase this figure to 20 billion euros by 2027 and subsequently to 40 billion euros. By the way, in February this year, the Chief Executive Officer of Rheinmetall, Mr. Papperger, said that he did not expect the armed conflict in Ukraine to end in 2026.

The Inspector (Commander) of the German Air Force, Holger Neumann, has also demonstrated a similar stance, recently confirming his country’s readiness to fight and, if necessary, to launch strikes against

Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg, nuclear weapons storage facilities on the Kola Peninsula, and the bases of the Black Sea Fleet. These revelations constitute a deliberate, unprovoked and potentially suicidal provocation. The more time passes, the more convinced we become that the “peace” proposals coming from Berlin, Paris and London are nothing more than a smokescreen designed to strengthen the European military-industrial complex and prepare for a war against Russia.

Let us put it this way: this tune has a familiar ring to it. We remember all too well the role played by Western industrialists during the 1930s and 1940s in outfitting the war machine of another criminal Nazi regime. Memories are also still fresh as to how, subsequently, the whole of Europe was “mobilized” in support of that regime – a process that occurred by degrees as the Wehrmacht advanced. All of this was followed, in the victorious year of 1945, by the inevitable demilitarization. The same fate also awaits their successors, who are currently supplying Volodymyr Zelenskyy just as zealously and for the same bumper profits.

Our particular focus on the militarization of Germany is entirely justified today. The date of 22 June invariably evokes historical parallels. We can assure you that we are monitoring the actions of our other Western opponents just as carefully.

Mr. Chairperson,

The policy of inflicting a “strategic defeat” on Russia is becoming part of the European Union’s doctrinal DNA and a long-term objective for the authorities in Brussels.

The starting point, of course, is the “White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030” published by the European Commission in March 2025. In that document our country is regarded as a key, fundamental, major and direct threat to Europe, and it is said that it will “remain a fundamental threat ... for the foreseeable future”. Alas, many people in Europe have come to believe this.

Thus, in February this year, the authorities in Warsaw updated their military doctrine. Poland is set to become “a force capable of delivering long-range strikes against key nodes and assets of the Russian State with a level of precision and firepower that the Polish military had never possessed before”. The Polish footprint in the development and production of the Liutyi unmanned aerial vehicle appears to be the first concrete step in this direction.

In April, Germany adopted its first-ever military strategy in its modern history. The document sets out the intention to transform the Bundeswehr into the “strongest conventional army in Europe”. Russia is, on the other hand – and I quote – “the largest and most direct threat to German, European and transatlantic security for the foreseeable future. It poses a whole-of-government and comprehensive military-strategic threat.” In this regard, from the German perspective, “all elements of the [S]tate” must be harnessed to counter Russia – naturally, with all the highly profitable consequences this entails for the German military-industrial complex.

Nor is the Netherlands lagging behind. In late May, the Dutch Ministry of Defence submitted a report to Parliament (“State of Defence – Spring 2026”), from which it appears that the country is effectively shifting from a “peacetime” mindset towards preparations for a potential large-scale armed conflict in Europe. Things have reached the point where the Netherlands authorities have begun working through scenarios in which thousands of prisoners of war, including Russian prisoners, would have to be held on Dutch territory. The “hotheads” in The Hague need to understand that, if Europe were to unleash a war against Russia, prisoner-of-war camps on their country’s territory would hardly be of any use to them.

At the same time, European political and military figures attribute aggressive expansionist intentions to Russia. As our country's senior leadership has stated on numerous occasions, this is "nonsense, provocation and disinformation aimed at extracting budgetary funds for the fight against Russia".

The European Union's long-term commitment to militarization and increased military spending, coupled with cuts to welfare budgets, will require the maintenance of a constant potential for conflict in the European region. The strengthening of European countries' military resources and the expansion of their capabilities in the field of hybrid operations are turning the continent into an area of heightened uncertainty as regards possible escalation.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Sergey Lavrov, noted in a recent article for the European media outlet Politico Europe that "this state of affairs poses serious threats to global security. A direct confrontation between NATO and Russia could rapidly escalate into an exchange of nuclear strikes, with catastrophic consequences." The complete text with a translation into various foreign languages is available on the Russian Foreign Ministry's website. However, Politico Europe itself was simply too afraid to publish this article. The "free" European media are doing everything they can to instil in the continent's population the absurd notion that victory in a proxy war against a nuclear power is a viable prospect.

In the concluding part of this statement, in view of previous discussions at the FSC, we should like to quote some excerpts from key Russian strategic planning documents. We hope that this will provide the necessary clarity and help to avoid dangerous "distortions" on the part of unscrupulous actors in international relations. Our colleagues can familiarize themselves in detail with the other doctrinal provisions in their own time.

Prevention of a nuclear military conflict as well as of any other military conflict is the basis of the military policy of the Russian federation.¹ The current Military Doctrine enshrines "the commitment of the Russian Federation to taking military measures for the protection of its national interests and the interests of its allies only after political, diplomatic, legal, economic, informational and other non-violent instruments have been exhausted".² The best evidence of our strict compliance with the aforementioned provisions is the period from 2014 to February 2022, when for eight years, the Russian Federation, on the basis of United Nations Security Council resolution 2202 of 17 February 2015, made every possible effort to achieve a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Ukraine. You were all witnesses to this, and some of you were even directly involved.

As regards the plans of a number of European countries to "bring the war deep into Russia", military security is the state of safety, which, in turn, is characterized either by the ability to counter a military threat or by the absence of such a threat. No other options are envisaged.³ The choice lies with those who create these threats.

At this juncture in history, "attempts to exert pressure on Russia, its allies and partners, to build up the military infrastructure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization near the Russian borders, to intensify intelligence activities, to develop the use of large military formations and nuclear weapons against the Russian Federation, are contributing to the increase in military dangers and military threats [to] the Russian Federation."⁴

¹ Section III, paragraph 20, of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation of 25 December 2014.

² Section I, paragraph 5, of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation of 25 December 2014.

³ Section I, paragraph 8(a), of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation of 25 December 2014.

⁴ Section IV, paragraph 35, of the 2021 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation.

In this context, we should like to emphasize in particular that Russia and Belarus “regard an armed attack on one of the member States of the Union State as an act of aggression against the Union State as a whole and will take appropriate retaliatory measures using all forces and assets at their disposal, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and the legislation of the Parties”.⁵

At the same time, “the Russian Federation reserves the right to employ nuclear weapons in response to the employment of nuclear and/or other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of an act of aggression against the Russian Federation and/or the Republic of Belarus as members of the Union State that involves the employment of conventional weapons and poses a critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity.”⁶

One final point. Current European governments are positioning themselves as a party to the conflict with an interest in Russia’s defeat. Russia, for its part, “does not consider itself to be an enemy of the West” and harbours “no hostile intentions” towards it,⁷ which – as is clear from the provisions we have just cited – does not preclude the possibility of taking decisive retaliatory measures should the need arise.

Thank you for your attention.

⁵ Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of 6 December 2024 between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus on Security Guarantees within the framework of the Union State.

⁶ Section III, paragraph 18, of the 2024 Fundamentals of the Russian Federation’s State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence.

⁷ Section II, paragraph 13, of the 2023 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation.